Ideas from 'Dispositions' by Stephen Mumford [1998], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Dispositions' by Mumford,Stephen [OUP 1998,978-0-19-925982-3]].
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
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14334
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Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
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14306
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Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
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14333
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Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
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14315
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Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another
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14332
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There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental
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14336
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Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
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14302
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A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
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14294
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Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
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14316
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If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate
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14317
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I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation
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14310
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Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
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14313
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All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise)
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14318
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Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
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14293
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Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons
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14298
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Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties
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14326
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Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
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14314
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If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do
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14325
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Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
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14312
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Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them)
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
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14291
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Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things
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14299
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There could be dispositions that are never manifested
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
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14323
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If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case
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14328
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Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes
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14331
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Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
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14295
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Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
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14309
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Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
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14311
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Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
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14319
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Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
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14342
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General laws depend upon the capacities of particulars, not the other way around
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
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14322
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If fragile just means 'breaks when dropped', it won't explain a breakage
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
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14320
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Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure
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14337
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Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation
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14343
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To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
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14324
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Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge
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26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
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14344
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Natural kinds, such as electrons, all behave the same way because we divide them by dispositions
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
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14338
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In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
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14339
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Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds?
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
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14340
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It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs
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14341
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Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
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14345
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The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
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14307
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Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them
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